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Abstract
Veto threats may offer presidents bargaining leverage, but such leverage will be
diminished if they and those with whom they transact business view a veto as hurting the
president’s approval rating and his party’s prospects in the next election. How concerned must
presidents be about the audience costs associated with a veto? Political science research
suggests that they should be in that the public does not like vetoes and punishes presidents when
they exercise this authority. In this article we test this argument with survey responses during
times after presidents have issued a veto threat but before an actual veto. While on average,
respondents register opposition to a veto, this preference varies greatly with the specific policy
in question and with respondents’ party identification and presidential approval. The results
suggest that opposition to a veto comes disproportionately, may be limited to politically distant
respondents, and thus may not be as costly as the net negative numbers suggest.

During the past several decades divided party control of Congress and the presidency and
the resulting gridlock have defined politics in Washington. As presidents resist opposition
majorities in Congress, they have been quick to issue veto threats. Occasionally, they have
followed up their threats with actual vetoes. Various research suggests that presidents absorb
serious audience costs when they rely on this Constitutional instrument. Groseclose and McCarty
(2001) construct a model of an opposition-Congress strategy that has it send presidents popular
legislation they are committed to vetoing. 1 Although the conditions necessary to set up this bind
are probably exceptional – after all, presidents will be disinclined to box themselves in by
committing to veto popular policies – the authors report evidence supporting their hypothesis
that Congress’ selection strategy accounts for the losses in presidents’ approval ratings. After
vetoing major bills, their approval rating drops an estimated 2 percentage points (Groseclose and
McCarty 2001).
Recently, a different rationale has been offered for expecting vetoes to take a toll on
presidents’ public support. The public simply does not like for presidents to act unilaterally
(Reeves and Rogowski 2015, 2016). Across a variety of scenarios – such as, initiating military
action and issuing executive orders – a plurality of survey respondents regard presidents’
unilateral actions with circumspection. More respondents than not even disapprove of
presidential vetoes to block legislation approved “by both chambers of Congress.” 2 Although
respondents’ party identification and evaluation of the current president’s job performance color
their views, the findings indicate a general aversion to “presidential power that exist apart from
their partisan proclivities” (Reeves and Rogowski 2015: 756). In sum, the public does not like
for occupants of the office to act unilaterally. Yet, when Sievert and Williamson (2018) asked
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respondents the extent to which they agreed with this use of the veto in the 2016 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study, they found a majority supported use of this power.
So, how do Americans respond as they watch presidents threaten to veto the opposition
majority’s legislation? This is a timely question because recent presidents have shown an evergrowing willingness to do so. Since their introduction in 1985, OMB’s Statements of
Administration Policy (SAPs) have become a favorite vehicle for presidents to issue veto threats
to Congress. Presidents explicitly threatened 818 bills with a veto during the thirty-year period
ending in 2014. Early evidence suggests that presidents’ growing reliance on veto threats is well
justified. Presidents have succeeded in knocking about half of the objectionable provisions out of
both appropriations (Hassell and Kernell 2016) and authorization bills (Guenther and Kernell
Forthcoming).
The prospect that the public would greet their veto with disapproval raises a serious
strategic issue for presidents contemplating whether and how to respond to unwelcomed,
opposition legislation. As they levy these threats, should presidents discount any negotiating
leverage they confer by lingering audience costs that could undermine their and their party’s
success in the next election?
In this article we perform several exercises that test the public’s support for vetoes and
veto threats across a variety of issues and political settings. The results offer more sanguine
prospects for presidents’ selective use of veto threats in negotiating with opposition majorities in
Congress. The first exercise analyzes 26 commercial public opinion surveys from 1947 through
2007 that ask respondents if the president should make good on a veto threat of a bill that
Congress is poised to pass. The second exercise draws serendipitously on one of the above
survey’s follow up questions on the importance of a bill’s party sponsorship on respondents’
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support for a veto. The third exercise pools the subset of the above surveys that include
partisanship and estimates multivariate models parsing the relative effects of partisanship,
approval, education, and party cues. These exercises indicate that opposition will be greatest
where the president’s support is already weak. With few exceptions, their core constituency has
their back when presidents confront opposition Congresses.

Exercise 1. Public Support for Veto Threats of Specific Legislation
It is one thing for a survey respondent to favor or oppose an abstract principle about
appropriate presidential actions and quite another to do so when specific policies and party
commitments are on the line. 3 From the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research’s survey
archive we located 36 questions in 26 national surveys taken between 1947 and 2015 that asked
respondents whether or not the president should make good on his threat to veto a specific bill. 4
(For more information about these survey items, see Appendix A.) Figure 1 reports that on
average 39 percent supported and 48 percent opposed the use of a veto with 12 percent either not
knowing or choosing a third option. So, the basic distributions lend credence to the claim that
more respondents tend to oppose than support use of the veto. Yet, the distributions in Figure 1
also reveal that Americans do not automatically oppose threatened vetoes. On 9 of the 36
questions, all occurring during the Clinton presidency, at least 50 percent of respondents favored
vetoing a particular bill. 5 Clinton also managed to round up the lowest level of support in any of
our surveys when only 10 percent endorsed his 1999 threat to veto a Democrat-sponsored bill to
expand prescription drug coverage for Medicare recipients. The next lowest support for a veto
was 14 percent, the figure agreeing with George W. Bush’s veto threat of the bipartisan McCain
Feingold campaign finance reform bill. 6 In sum, the wide range of responses to veto threats in
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Figure 1 clearly presents respondents as considering the pros and cons of a policy in judging this
particular use of the president’s veto authority.
[Figure 1 About Here]
In Figure 2 we report the results of fifteen of the questions in surveys that ask whether the
president should use his veto pen and also include the respondent's partisan affiliation. In seven
of these fifteen polling questions, at least half of Americans support the use of the veto (although
six of these seven are related to the same bill – health care). However, partisanship clearly
influences opinions. For ten of the 15 polling questions, a majority of the president's copartisans support use of the veto. The number of polls indicating majority support for a veto
drops to eight for independents and to two among opposition party respondents. Further, in all
but one instance support for a veto was substantially higher among the president's co-partisans
(averaging 54 percent) than among independents (averaging 43 percent) and opposition partisans
(averaging 29 percent). 7
[Figure 2 About Here]
An examination of legislative histories suggests this support from co-partisans emboldens
presidents to follow through when needed and can even persuade Congress to capitulate. For all
but one of the 21 bills asked about in Figure 1, we were able to identify the relevant bills and
their fates. Ten bills were vetoed, seven died in Congress, and three became law. Among the
seven bills covered by questions in Figure 2, four were vetoed, three became law. While
Congress did attempt overrides for a few of the vetoes, all but one of these attempts (for the TaftHartley Act in 1947) failed. There was no significant difference in means in public support for
vetoes across these fates. In sum, presidents do not need majority support from the public to
prevail in legislative battles.
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Exercise 2: Manipulating Partisan Sources of Bill Sponsorship
To probe further into the impact of partisanship, we begin with the results of a 1999
Gallup poll that includes an experimental feature by asking respondents two hypothetical
questions on vetoing tax cuts that are designed to elicit attitudinal differences based on party
identification. Both questions, reproduced in Table 1, ask about a bill that would cut taxes by
hundreds of billions over a ten-year period. The first presents a Republican-sponsored bill that
would cut $800 billion in taxes; the second refers to a Democratic bill that would more modestly
pare $300 billion in taxes. Although the varying dollar amounts is unfortunate for establishing a
controlled environment, it arguably better reflects the political parties’ well-established, differing
stances on taxes. Yet in that both involve large tax cuts, and all other details are the same, except
for the party identified as sponsoring it, we are afforded an opportunity to see how party
referents orient attitudes toward veto threats.
[Table 1 About Here]
Overall support for a veto of the larger Republican sponsored tax bill is much greater
than support for the Democratic sponsored tax bill. To further disentangle the impact of
partisanship, we conducted difference of means tests comparing the responses of Democrats,
Republicans, and Independents to the two questions. As Table 1 shows, while overall and
among independents, support is significantly higher for a veto of the Republican-sponsored bill
than for the Democratic sponsored bill, we see a different pattern emerge among partisans.
Nearly twice as many Democrats support a veto of the Republican sponsored tax bill (51 percent
than the one identified as Democrat-sponsored (26 percent). Meanwhile, 23 percent of
Republicans supported a veto of the Democrat-sponsored bill compared to nearly 17 percent for
the Republican one. 8 The fact that Republicans are less interested in vetoing tax cuts, whatever
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its partisan source, tell us that beyond partisan cues, respondents also consider the policy
substance of the legislation.

Exercise 3: Estimating Veto Support as a Function of Party and Policy
Evidence abounds in the relationships uncovered thus far that partisanship and policy
substance contribute heavily to the public’s posture on a veto. Are these two covariates all that
matter and what do they tell us about attitudes toward presidents’ use of their veto authority?
Drawing on irregular commercial surveys that contain different question formats and wordings
for all the variables offers both advantages and disadvantages. The variety prevents controlling
for the effects of the broader settings that vary over time; it does allow us, however, to examine
(and reject) question wording as a source of bias in these responses.
In Table 2, we estimate two multivariate models of veto support based on partisanship
(measured with two dichotomous variables for the president’s party and the opposition party,
with independents the omitted category) and job performance approval (measured as a
dichotomous variable coded one for approve) while controlling for education (measured on a
four point scale, from did not graduate high school to four or more years of college) and
questions that specifically identify a bill as written by the president’s party(dichotomous
measure). Then, in Model 2, we further unpack how partisan variations among respondents and
in the White House shape support for vetoes. 9
[Table 2 About Here]
Repeated cross section designs such as these pose challenges for estimation. Both
temporal and spatial variation is likely. While Lebo and Weber (2015) create a solution that
accounts for both types of variation for continuous dependent variables, this approach cannot be
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applied to ones that are binary. We choose a modeling approach that accounts for the temporal
variation through employing random effects logistic regression grouped by survey. 10
The average observed level of support for vetoes across all respondents in these surveys
was 42 percent. The results in Table 2 indicate that approval of the president increases the
likelihood of supporting the president’s use of the veto. Members of the president’s party are
more likely to support a veto while members of the opposition party are less likely to support a
veto compared to independents. When the question identifies the bill as being written by the
president’s party, support for a veto declines substantially. In addition, education has a negative
and statistically significant relationship with support for a veto. This differs from Reeves and
Rogowski’s (2015) and Sievert and Williamson’s (2018) finding that higher levels of education
are associated with higher levels of support for the veto. This makes sense since their question
asked respondents to agree or disagree: "The president should not be able to veto legislation that
has been passed by both chambers of Congress." Those with higher levels of education would be
more likely to know that the Constitution gives the president this power. Yet, when it comes to
support for specific vetoes, those with higher levels of education are actually less likely to
support the president following through on his threat. Finally, the results in Model 2 indicate
that support for vetoes is higher when the president is a Democrat.
To better understand the impact of these variables, we estimate predicted probabilities for
specific covariates of interest in Figures 3 and 4. Holding education at its mean level and limiting
estimates to bills not identified as sponsored by the president’s party, Figure 3 reports strong
likelihood of endorsement among members of the president’s party, especially among those who
approve of the president. Among approvers of the president, the probability of supporting a veto
is .65 among members of the president’s party, .53 among Independents, and .38 among
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members of the opposition party. Meanwhile, disapproval of the president decreases opposition
party members’ predicted probability of supporting a veto by just over 11 percentage points
while it decreases the predicted probability of supporting a veto among Independents and
members of the president’s party by nearly 13 percentage points. The predicted probabilities
suggest that regardless of approval, the president’s party is more likely than not to support the
president’s veto. Independents who approve are also more likely than not to support the
president’s veto, although the lower 95 percent confidence interval for this estimate dips below
50 percent. Meanwhile, regardless of approval of the president, opposition party members are
more likely than not to oppose the president’s veto. Clearly, partisanship has a strong impact on
the likelihood of supporting a veto and approval of the president only partially mitigates this
influence.
[Figure 3 About Here]
The question remains whether this partisan-conditioned support for a veto changes based
on which party holds the presidency. Reeves and Rogowski (2015) found that Democrats were
more likely to favor the president’s ability to use a veto. While their question about the veto
directs respondents to think “about the Office of the Presidency – and not any particular
president,” a Democrat held the presidency at the time and this could influence Democrats’
higher support. While Model 1 cannot help us identify whether there are differences in support
for a veto based on whether the president’s and opposition party members are Democrats or
Republicans, to explore those potential differences, we calculate predicted probabilities based on
the results of Model 2, which includes a variable indicating the president’s party. The predicted
probabilities plotted in Figure 4 provides evidence of interesting if somewhat asymmetric party
dynamics at work. Figure 4a shows Democrats link their approval more closely to the party of
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the president. They swing from 72 percent probability of approving when a Democrat they like is
in the White House to 14 percent when a Republican they disapprove is president. Republican
endorsements change less across these dimensions – 46 to 34 percent respectively in comparable
situations. Yet, given that these survey questions only span two presidencies – Democrat Bill
Clinton and Republican George W. Bush – more study is needed.
[Figure 4 About Here]
In Figure 4b we report these relationships for the highly unusual situation (occurring in
only one survey) where the question identifies that the veto threat is directed at a bill proposed
by the president’s congressional party. Support for a veto drops dramatically in these situations.
Yet, the results in Figure 4b show that the highest predicted probability of support for a veto
against the president’s party was at .20 among Democrats who approve of their Democratic
president. Meanwhile, among Republicans who disapprove of the Democratic president, the
probability of support for a veto is a miniscule .05. In contrast, the predicted probability of
support for a veto among Republicans who approve of their Republican president is only .05 and
this drops to .02 among Democrats who disapprove of the Republican president. Once again,
Democrats exhibit larger changes in probability of support for a veto based on the president’s
party and whether they approve of the president than do Republicans. Our results also suggest
that when respondents are told a bill is sponsored by the president’s party they are highly
unlikely to support a veto of it. This cue dramatically reduces the probability of support for a
veto across the board. While this finding needs additional investigation, it appears that
opposition to this unilateral action heightens when the question informs respondents that the
president is using this defensive weapon against his own party.
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Conclusion: How the Public Chooses Sides
Vetoes pit presidents against Congress. Overall, when we average across all the survey
questions over time, about 40% of Americans side with the president and support use of a veto.
This suggests that in general, a majority do support letting the law passed by Congress prevail,
and some bias against unilateral action by presidents. However, when it comes to support for
specific vetoes, Americans index their opinions by partisanship and approval. Presidents can
typically expect much greater support from their co-partisans and those who approve of their
performance in office. They can also expect those with lower levels of education to be slightly
more likely to take their side, while those with higher levels of education are slightly more likely
to support Congress in these battles. We find support for vetoes also varies by the party of the
president (and perhaps the president in office), a topic that merits further investigation beyond
what our data allows. The results suggest Democrats may be more strongly driven by party cues
in their support for a veto while Republicans seem to have a strong core that opposes vetoes
regardless of the president’s party. Finally, the results based on the available commercial
surveys suggest that Americans’ antipathy for the veto is strongest when used against policies
promoted by the president’s own party. This clearly deserves further study. Still, the results
show that bias against unilateral action in the form of a veto is far from uniform. Instead,
support for a veto is highly conditioned by political views and circumstances, a finding that
comports better with the results of some recent experiments about presidents’ use of unilateral
action (Reeves and Rogowski 2015; Reeves and Rogowski 2016; Christenson and Kriner 2017)
than others (Reeves, Rogowski, Seo and Stone 2017). In addition, we find little evidence this
bias against unilateral action inhibits presidents from following through threats with acts. As
noted above, presidents vetoed ten of the threatened bills examined with these surveys, and
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Congress backed away, failing to pass another seven of these bills. Presidents may face audience

costs when using a veto, but these costs vary across audience members and across issues. And it

does not prevent presidents from issuing and executing veto threats.

Figure 1. Support for President’s Veto of Specific Legislation

President's
Party
Controls
House

Unified
Government

Support Veto

N.B. Specific wording of these survey questions is available in the appendix.
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Figure 2. Support for President’s Veto According to Party Identification

President's
Party Controls
House

Unified Government
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Table 1. How Support for Veto Changes by Party Sponsor of Bill*
Survey

Date

Question

N

Overall
Support
for Veto

Support among
the President's
Fellow Democrats
(N=323)

Support Among
Independents
(N=359)

Support
Among
Republicans
(N=292)

Gallup
Poll

Aug99

502

35.4%
(N=177)

51.35%
(N=76)

37.5%
(N=72)

16.56%
(N=25)

Gallup
Poll

Aug99

If Congress passes
a Republicansponsored bill to
cut taxes by
approximately 800
billion dollars over
the next 10 years,
do you think
President (Bill)
Clinton should sign
that bill into law, or
should he veto the
bill so it does not
become law?
If Congress passes
a Democratsponsored bill to
cut taxes by
approximately 300
billion dollars over
the next 10 years,
do you think
President (Bill)
Clinton should sign
that bill into law, or
should he veto the
bill so it does not
become law?

501

26.8%
(N=134)

26.29%
(N=46)

29.34%
(N=49)

23.40%
(N=33)

t=2.92;
p=.00

t=4.78; p=.00

t=1.63; p=.05

t=-1.47; p=.07

Results of Difference of Means
Test Across Questions

* Partisanship is determined by the question “In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a
Democrat, or an Independent.” Those who volunteered another party, said they don’t know, or refused to answer
are not included in this table. Don’t knows and refusals to answer the veto questions are treated as missing data. In
addition, mean support for Republicans, Democrats, and Independents are all significantly different from each other
for the Republican-sponsored bill at the .00 level but their mean responses are not significantly different from each
other for the question about the Democrat-sponsored bill.

14

Table 2. Modeling Support for a Veto

(1)

(2)

Approval

0.521***
(0.0442)

0.520***
(0.0442)

President’s Party

0.479***
(0.0620)

0.479***
(0.0620)

Opposition Party

-0.619***
(0.0599)

-0.619***
(0.0598)

Education

-0.0703***
(0.0200)

-0.0696***
(0.0200)

Question Identifies Bill
Written by President’s Party

-1.974***
(0.445)

-2.330***
(0.568)

Democratic President

_cons

lnsig2u
_cons

N

1.127***
(0.323)
-0.196
(0.217)

-0.977***
(0.280)

-0.625
(0.387)

-1.263**
(0.386)

13589

13589

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Both models employ random effects logistic regression grouped by survey.
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Figure 3. Support for a Veto Based on Party and Approval
1
0.9
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0.7
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President's
Party,
Approves

President's Independent, Independent, Opposition
Party
Approves
Disapproves
Party,
Disapproves
Approves

Opposition
Party,
Disapproves

The predicted probabilities in the figure above are generated from Model 1. They are
represented by dots in the figure above. They represent the probabilities of an average person
supporting a veto given specific covariate values (with the random effects term at 0). To
calculate each of these, education is set at its mean level and the question does not identify the
bill as being written by the president’s party. However, in order to generate confidence intervals
for these predicted probabilities, the random effects term must be taken into account. Thus, the
lines above instead represent 95% confidence intervals for probabilities for a specific individual
given the quantities of interest (in other words, the random effects term is not set to 0). As a
result, the predicted probabilities do not always fall in the middle of the confidence interval.
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Figure 4. Predicted Probability of Approving of a Veto by President’s Party
a. The Bill is Not Identified as Written by the President’s Party
1
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Democratic President

Republican President

0.8
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0.4
0.3
0.2
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0

b.

Democrat who Republican who Republican who Democrat who
approves of the disapproves of the approves of the disapproves of the
president
president
president
president

The Bill is Identified as Written by the President’s Party
1
0.9

Democratic President

Republican President

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Democrat who Republican
Republican Democrat who
approves of
who
who approves disapproves of
the president disapproves of
of the
the president
the president
president

The predicted probabilities in the figures above are generated from Model 2. They are
represented by dots in the figure above. They represent the probabilities of an average person
supporting a veto given specific covariate values (with the random effects term at 0). To
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calculate each of these, education is set at its mean level. However, in order to generate
confidence intervals for these predicted probabilities, the random effects term must be taken into
account. Thus, the lines above instead represent 95% confidence intervals for probabilities for a
specific individual given the quantities of interest (in other words, the random effects term is not
set to 0). As a result, the predicted probabilities do not always fall in the middle of the
confidence interval.
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Appendix A: Support for Vetoes

Survey

Date

Gallup Poll

Apr-47

Gallup Poll
(AIPO)

Jun-47

Harris Poll

Jul-91

Harris Poll

Jul-91

Harris Poll

Jul-91

Harris Poll

Jul-91

Harris Poll

Jul-91

Gallup Poll

Oct-91

Question
If a bill that cuts down labor's power a great
deal is passed by Congress, would you like to
have President Truman give it his okay or veto
it?
Do you think that President (Harry) Truman
should sign this labor bill (to regulate labor
unions) or veto it (that is, refuse to approve it)?
President Bush and the Democratic Congress
have had major disagreements over bills the
Congress has passed. As a result, he has
vetoed or has threatened to veto many key
bills. Let me read you several bills where that
has happened.... Sharp cuts in defense
spending.... Do you think President Bush is
more right or more wrong to veto that bill?
(President Bush and the Democratic Congress
have had major disagreements over bills the
Congress has passed. As a result, he has
vetoed or has threatened to veto many key
bills.) Let me read you several bills where that
has happened.... The Civil Rights Act of
1991.... Do you think President Bush is more
right or more wrong to veto that bill?
(President Bush and the Democratic Congress
have had major disagreements over bills the
Congress has passed. As a result, he has
vetoed or has threatened to veto many key
bills.) Let me read you several bills where that
has happened.... A bill to repeal the Supreme
Court decision prohibiting a doctor from
discussing abortion with a patient in a federally
funded family planning clinic.... Do you think
President Bush is more right or more wrong to
veto that bill?
(President Bush and the Democratic Congress
have had major disagreements over bills the
Congress has passed. As a result, he has
vetoed or has threatened to veto many key
bills.) Let me read you several bills where that
has happened.... A bill to allow parents to take
12 week of unpaid leave after having a baby....
Do you think President Bush is more right or
more wrong to veto that bill?
(President Bush and the Democratic Congress
have had major disagreements over bills the
Congress has passed. As a result, he has
vetoed or has threatened to veto many key
bills.) Let me read you several bills where that
has happened.... A bill to establish national
health insurance paid for by the federal
government, but which would not change the
system of having private doctors and private
hospitals.... Do you think President Bush is
more right or more wrong to veto that bill?
Congress also passed a bill requiring
companies to allow employees to take up to 12
weeks unpaid leave if they had a new baby, or
if there were a serious illness in their immediate
family. President Bush has said he opposes the
bill because it might hurt the economy and
create too much government interference in

Should Veto/
Positive
Feeling if
Veto

Should Sign/
Negative
Feeling if Veto

Third
Option

38

46

16

33

49

19

46

48

6

36

38

26

36

59

5

34

63

3

30

65

5

44

53

3
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Gallup Poll

Oct-91

Time/CNN/
Yankelovich
Partners Poll

Mar94

Gallup/CNN/
USA Today Poll

Jun-94

Time/CNN/
Yankelovich
Partners Poll

Jul-94

NBC News/Wall
Street Journal
Poll

Jul-94

CBS News/New
York Times Poll

Sep94

Time/CNN/
Yankelovich
Partners Poll

Sep95

NBC News/Wall
Street Journal
Poll

Oct-95

ABC News/
Washington Post
Poll

Nov95

Nov95

Gallup/CNN/
USA Today Poll

business. Would you like to see Bush sign this
bill into law, or do you think he should veto it?
Congress recently passed a bill to extend
unemployment benefits beyond the regular 26week period. To provide the 6.4 billion dollars
needed to extend benefits, a budget
emergency would have to be declared that
President Bush says is not justified. Would you
like to see Bush sign this bill into law, or do you
think he should veto it?
Suppose Congress passes a health care
reform bill that does not guarantee health care
coverage for all Americans. Do you think
President (Bill) Clinton should veto such a bill
or not?
Suppose Congress passes a bill which would
improve the country's health care system, but
would not guarantee coverage for every
American. Do you think President (Bill) Clinton
should veto the bill and send it back to
Congress, or should he sign it?
Suppose Congress passes a health care
reform bill that does not guarantee health care
coverage for all Americans. Do you think
President (Bill) Clinton should veto such a bill
or not?
If Congress passes a health care plan that
includes a number of health care reforms, but
does not guarantee health insurance for all
Americans, should President (Bill) Clinton sign
the bill or veto the bill?
President (Bill) Clinton said in January (1994)
that he would veto any health care bill that did
not provide insurance for all Americans. If
Congress passes a health care bill that
improves insurance coverage, but does not
provide coverage for everybody, should
President Clinton sign it, or should he veto it?
Do you think President (Bill) Clinton should veto
legislation which would make changes such as
these in environmental policy (expanding
logging, mining, and ranching on public lands,
reducing protection for endangered species,
opening up the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
in Alaska to oil and gas exploration), or don't
you feel that way?
As you may know, Republicans in Congress
are in the process of passing a federal budget
that they say will balance the budget in seven
years and reduce taxes for most families.
President (Bill) Clinton says he will veto the
budget because he believes it cuts too much
from certain domestic programs and gives tax
breaks mostly to the wealthy. In your view,
should the President sign or veto this budget?
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26

4

55

33
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65

26

9

50

42

8

51

34

15

32

61

7

Do you think (President Bill) Clinton should sign
the budget or veto it?

33

59

8

Currently the Republicans in Congress are in
the final stages of completing an overall budget
for the federal government. This is the budget
bill that is intended to balance the federal
budget within seven years, cut taxes, and cut
the rate of spending on such programs as
Medicare and Medicaid. From what you have
heard or read so far about the Republican
budget, do you think President (Bill) Clinton
should sign the budget bill or should he veto it?
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NBC News/Wall
Street Journal
Poll

Nov95

Gallup/CNN/
USA Today Poll

Dec95

Legislative
Riders and The
Environment
Survey

Jun-98

Gallup Poll

Aug99

Gallup Poll

Aug99

Gallup Poll

Aug99

Wirthlin Quorum
Survey

Aug99

Wirthlin Quorum
Survey

Aug99

NBC News/Wall
Street Journal
Poll

Apr-01

NBC News/Wall
Street Journal
Poll

Jun-01

Republicans in Congress are in the process of
passing a federal budget that they say will
balance the budget in seven years and reduce
taxes for most families. President (Bill) Clinton
says he will veto this budget because he
believes it cuts too much from certain domestic
programs and gives tax breaks mostly to the
wealthy. In your view, should the President sign
or veto this budget?
As you may know, both houses of Congress
have passed a bill to change the country's
welfare system. Based on what you have read
or heard about this bill, do you think President
(Bill) Clinton should sign this bill or veto it?
Generally speaking, if Congress attaches riders
which relax environmental regulations to
legislation do you think President (Bill) Clinton
should veto the legislation and send it back to
Congress to be passed without the rider or
should he sign the legislation into law?
If Congress passes a Republican-sponsored
bill to cut taxes by approximately 800 billion
dollars over the next 10 years, do you think
President (Bill) Clinton should sign that bill into
law, or should he veto the bill so it does not
become law?
If Congress passes a Democrat-sponsored bill
to cut taxes by approximately 300 billion dollars
over the next 10 years, do you think President
(Bill) Clinton should sign that bill into law, or
should he veto the bill so it does not become
law?
If Congress passes a Democrat-sponsored bill
to expand Medicare coverage to include
prescription drugs for Medicare recipients, do
you think President (Bill) Clinton should sign
that bill into law, or should be veto the bill so it
does not become law?
And, what do you think President (Bill) Clinton
should do with this tax cut bill when Congress
sends it to him... sign it into law, or veto it?
And, what do you think President (Bill) Clinton
should do with this tax cut bill when Congress
sends it to him... sign it into law, veto it, or
reach a compromise with the Republicans on a
modified tax cut?
Recently, the United States Senate passed a
campaign finance bill sponsored by Senators
John McCain and Russ Feingold that would
ban so-called soft money contributions to the
two national political parties, increase individual
contribution limits, and restrict issue
advertisements run by corporations, interest
groups, and unions close to an election. Do you
think that President (George W.) Bush should
sign the bill or veto the bill, or do you not care
either way?
During the spring (2001), the United States
Senate passed a campaign finance bill
sponsored by Senators John McCain and Russ
Feingold that would ban so-called soft money
contributions to the two national political
parties, increase individual contribution limits,
and restrict issue advertisements run by
corporations, interest groups, and unions close
to an election. If the bill reaches President
(George W.) Bush, do you think that he should
sign the bill or veto the bill, or do you not care
either way?
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NBC News/Wall
Street Journal
Poll

Jun-01

FDA Authority
Over Tobacco
Survey

Aug02

FDA Authority
Over Tobacco
Survey

Aug02

Gallup/USA
Today Poll

Apr-07

FOX
News/Opinion
Dynamics Poll

Jul-07

Los Angeles
Times/
Bloomberg Poll

Apr-07

New Models
National Brand
Poll

Sep07

Fox News Poll

Jan-15

During the spring (2001), the United States
Senate passed a campaign finance bill that
would ban so-called soft money contributions to
the two national political parties, increase
individual contribution limits, and restrict issue
advertisements run by corporations, interest
groups, and unions close to an election. If the
bill reaches President (George W.) Bush, do
you think that he should sign the bill or veto the
bill, or do you not care either way?
If Congress passes a law that allows the FDA
(Food and Drug Administration) to regulate
cigarettes, what would you expect President
(George W.) Bush to do about it when it
reaches the White House?...Reject it as an
unacceptable compromise and veto it, view it
as an acceptable compromise and sign it
If Congress acts on a bipartisan basis to pass a
law that allows the FDA (Food and Drug
Administration) to regulate cigarettes, what
would you want President (George W.) Bush to
do with the bill?...Sign it into law, veto the bill
As you may know, President (George W.) Bush
has said he will veto a bill to expand federal
funding for embryonic stem cell research. Do
you think Bush should--or should not--veto this
bill?
Do you think President (George W.) Bush
should veto legislation that sets a specific date
for withdrawing US (United States) troops from
Iraq, or not?
As you may know, Democrats in both houses of
Congress passed legislation that ties further
funding of the war in Iraq to targeted dates for
withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq. (George
W.) Bush says he will veto any measure that
sets such a timetable because he believes it
would tie the hands of battlefield commanders
and make defeat in Iraq more likely. Do you
think that Bush should sign a funding
authorization that includes a timetable for
withdrawal, or should he veto that legislation?
If President (George W.) Bush decided to veto
this (children's health) bill, would you favor or
oppose his veto?
Do you think President (Barack) Obama should
sign or veto legislation approving the building of
the Keystone XL Pipeline that would transport
oil from Canada to refineries in the United
States?
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Appendix B: Party Status and Support for Vetoes
Survey

Date

Question

Overall
Support
for Veto

Time/CNN/
Yankelovich Partners
Poll

Mar-94

56

64

55

47

Gallup/CNN/USA
Today Poll

Jun-94

62

74

67

53

Time/CNN/Yankelovich
Partners Poll

Jul-94

55

68

59

40

NBC News/Wall Street
Journal Poll

Jul-94

65

73

69

54

CBS News/New York
Times Poll

Sep-94

50

51

52

35

Time/CNN/Yankelovich
Partners Poll

Sep-95

51

56

56

44

ABC
News/Washington
Post Poll

Nov-95

Suppose Congress passes a health
care reform bill that does not guarantee
health care coverage for all Americans.
Do you think President (Bill) Clinton
should veto such a bill or not?
Suppose Congress passes a bill which
would improve the country's health
care system, but would not guarantee
coverage for every American. Do you
think President (Bill) Clinton should
veto the bill and send it back to
Congress, or should he sign it?
Suppose Congress passes a health
care reform bill that does not guarantee
health care coverage for all Americans.
Do you think President (Bill) Clinton
should veto such a bill or not?
If Congress passes a health care plan
that includes a number of health care
reforms, but does not guarantee health
insurance for all Americans, should
President (Bill) Clinton sign the bill or
veto the bill?
President (Bill) Clinton said in January
(1994) that he would veto any health
care bill that did not provide insurance
for all Americans. If Congress passes a
health care bill that improves insurance
coverage, but does not provide
coverage for everybody, should
President Clinton sign it, or should he
veto it?
Do you think President (Bill) Clinton
should veto legislation which would
make changes such as these in
environmental policy (expanding
logging, mining, and ranching on public
lands, reducing protection for
endangered species, opening up the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in
Alaska to oil and gas exploration), or
don't you feel that way?
Do you think (President Bill) Clinton
should sign the budget or veto it?

33

80

55

24

Gallup/CNN/USA
Today Poll

Nov-95

60

81

62

29

Currently the Republicans in Congress
are in the final stages of completing an
overall budget for the federal
government. This is the budget bill that
is intended to balance the federal
budget within seven years, cut taxes,
and cut the rate of spending on such
programs as Medicare and Medicaid.
From what you have heard or read so
far about the Republican budget, do
you think President (Bill) Clinton should

Support
Among the
President's
Partisans

Support
Among
Independents

Support
Among the
Opposition
Party

23
sign the budget bill or should he veto
it?

Gallup/CNN/USA
Today Poll

Dec-95

Gallup Poll

Aug-99

NBC News/Wall Street
Journal Poll

Apr-01

NBC News/Wall Street
Journal Poll

Jun-01

NBC News/Wall Street
Journal Poll

Jun-01

Gallup/USA Today Poll

Apr-07

As you may know, both houses of
Congress have passed a bill to change
the country's welfare system. Based on
what you have read or heard about this
bill, do you think President (Bill) Clinton
should sign this bill or veto it?
If Congress passes a Democratsponsored bill to expand Medicare
coverage to include prescription drugs
for Medicare recipients, do you think
President (Bill) Clinton should sign that
bill into law, or should be veto the bill
so it does not become law?
Recently, the United States Senate
passed a campaign finance bill
sponsored by Senators John McCain
and Russ Feingold that would ban socalled soft money contributions to the
two national political parties, increase
individual contribution limits, and
restrict issue advertisements run by
corporations, interest groups, and
unions close to an election. Do you
think that President (George W.) Bush
should sign the bill or veto the bill, or do
you not care either way?
During the spring (2001), the United
States Senate passed a campaign
finance bill sponsored by Senators
John McCain and Russ Feingold that
would ban so-called soft money
contributions to the two national
political parties, increase individual
contribution limits, and restrict issue
advertisements run by corporations,
interest groups, and unions close to an
election. If the bill reaches President
(George W.) Bush, do you think that he
should sign the bill or veto the bill, or do
you not care either way?
During the spring (2001), the United
States Senate passed a campaign
finance bill that would ban so-called
soft money contributions to the two
national political parties, increase
individual contribution limits, and
restrict issue advertisements run by
corporations, interest groups, and
unions close to an election. If the bill
reaches President (George W.) Bush,
do you think that he should sign the bill
or veto the bill, or do you not care
either way?
As you may know, President (George
W.) Bush has said he will veto a bill to
expand federal funding for embryonic
stem cell research. Do you think Bush
should--or should not--veto this bill?
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25

22

20

19

28

25

17

31

52

28

14

24
Los Angeles
Times/Bloomberg Poll

Apr-07

As you may know, Democrats in both
houses of Congress passed legislation
that ties further funding of the war in
Iraq to targeted dates for withdrawal of
combat troops from Iraq. (George W.)
Bush says he will veto any measure
that sets such a timetable because he
believes it would tie the hands of
battlefield commanders and make
defeat in Iraq more likely. Do you think
that Bush should sign a funding
authorization that includes a timetable
for withdrawal, or should he veto that
legislation?

43

80

42

18
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Notes

1

Durr, Gilmour and Wolbrecht (1997) report that public approval of Congress increases

after a veto. This is consistent with Groseclose and McCarty’s argument that Congress sends
presidents popular bills to veto to rack up audience approval.
2

The question used in the recent spate of research into public opinion on presidents’

unilateral efforts to make policy asks respondents to agree or disagree with the statement, “The
president should not be able to veto legislation that has been passed by both chambers of
Congress” (Reeves and Rogowski 2015).
3

Even abstract questions appear to find respondents consulting their partisanship in

deciding what they think about the president’s veto authority (Reeves and Rogowski 2015;
Sievert and Williamson 2018).
4

For more information on these surveys see Appendix A. To find these polls, we initially

searched iPoll for the term “veto,” and from them identified those questions that asked
specifically whether the president should sign or veto a bill. In some instances, the details of the
bill included in the question are hypothetical. Other questions associating vote preferences and
levels of disappointment with a veto or lack of it were excluded.
5

More than two-thirds endorsed President Clinton’s 1998 threat to veto appropriation bills

containing riders that relax environmental regulations. Similarly, he succeeded in rallying public
support for his State of the Union pledge to veto any health care reform bill that fell short of
universal coverage; for spending bills containing cuts to Medicare and Medicaid; and for bills
containing a widely perceived tax break for the wealthy.
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6

When a similar question was asked about a potential veto of this bill a few months later,

support increased to twenty percent.
7

The only exception (August 1999) asked if the Democratic president should veto a

Democratic bill. The smallest gap observed between the president’s co-partisans and members
of the opposition party, of five percentage points, was on whether George W. Bush should veto
bipartisan-sponsored campaign finance reform.
8

Both sets of differences are significant at .001.
9

We add a dichotomous measure for the party of the president (with one indicating the

president is a Democrat) We also estimated models with alternate specifications. Some of these
included additional controls for bill type or unified government (although all instances of
questions about veto threats during unified government were for one bill – health care reform in
1994). While some of these controls were significant, we decided to present the results of these
pared down models found in Table 2 for simplicity’s sake. They yield the same conclusions
about our variables of interest.
10

While less than ideal, it represents the best alternative among approaches commonly

used in political science. Logistic regression models (that ignore this variation) and logistic
regression models with clustered standard errors (that allows for the possibility of residuals
correlated within surveys) produce similarly consistent estimates with one exception: education
is not significant in model 2 when using logistic regression with clustered standard errors.
Random effects logistic regression grouped by survey generates more accurate standard errors
and conclusions about statistical significance compared to the other approaches.

